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Abstract: 
  
Female entrepreneurs are much less frequent than male entrepreneurs. In this paper 
we investigate a possible culprit: access to financial services.  We use a dataset with 
entrepreneurship rates by opportunity and by need from the Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitor and indicators of financial institutions from Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine 
(2000) for 41 developed and developing countries from 2001 to 2004. Our conclusions are 
that financial development, though generally encouraging entrepreneurial activity, is 
unlikely, by itself, to contribute to bring male and female entrepreneurship rates closer 
together. Moreover, our results suggest that it is entrepreneurship by need that is most 
affected by financial development, suggesting that the possible more complex aspects of 
evaluating projects associated with market or technological opportunities are not overcome 
by aggregate financial development and need more specific measures. 
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1. Motivation 
Female entrepreneurs are much less frequent than male entrepreneurs. As 
recently documented in Minniti et al. (2005) and Llussá (2009a), the entrepreneurship 
rate is lower for females than for males, and significantly so.
1
 Understanding why 
female and male entrepreneurship rates differ so blatantly is a far more complicated 
matter than documenting it. In this paper we investigate a possible culprit: access to 
financial services. We investigate the role of country financial development on the rate 
of entrepreneurship, highlighting how female and male entrepreneurs are differently 
affected. 
Financial development is an important element of the growth process. Wide 
access to external capital at reasonable interest rates fosters enterprise growth as well as 
the creation of new business firms.
2
 In the case of nascent entrepreneurs, access to 
external resources is a key issue, as both the youth and the size of the venture limit the 
willingness of financial institutions to lend, dependent on little guarantees in terms of 
collateral. Financing constraints are often the major reason for potential entrepreneurs to 
postpone creating a new venture
3
. If men have easier access to financial services, then 
the lower entrepreneurial activity of females can be partly explained. In this paper we 
estimate the differential impact of financial development on female and male 
entrepreneurs. We also test whether financial development affects different 
entrepreneurs in different ways, depending on age, educational status, work status and 
personal income. We conduct this exercise for entrepreneurs driven by “need” and by 
“opportunity”. By examining the role of an array of standard indicators of financial 
development on different types of entrepreneurs, we provide a detailed picture of the 
relation between finance, gender and entrepreneurship.  
New businesses play an important role in furthering economic growth through 
competition and innovation. Any discouragement of entrepreneurial activity for 
discriminatory reasons imposes a cost on the economy. If gender discrimination in 
finance explains the lower rate of female entrepreneurship, and financial development 
                                                 
1 The only exception is the creation of new firms in poor countries for reasons of “need”, where the female 
and male entrepreneurship rates are statistically the same. See Llussá (2009a). Entrepreneurship by need is the 
situation where individuals are mostly “pushed” into creating new businesses to exit a bad condition, such as 
unemployment or a need for additional resources. It contrasts with entrepreneurship by “opportunity”, where 
individuals are mostly “pulled” into creating a new venture because of an attractive opportunity such as the 
availability of a new technology or idea with market potential. 
2 Exploiting market opportunities depends on the availability of capital. Evans and Leighton (1989) and 
Aldrich and Zimmer (1986) argue that access to financial resources enhance the probability of business 
opportunity exploitation. 
3 For an analysys of the performance of private equity partnerships in the US see Kaplan and Schoar (2005). 
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helps overcome this problem, a new and important rationale for promoting financial 
development has been found. 
 
 
 
2. Entrepreneurship, finance and gender  
 
2.1. Finance 
 
The institutional environment is a key determinant of the number of 
entrepreneurs. Baumol (1996) goes as far as hypothesizing that the actual share of 
possible entrepreneurs in any society is fairly constant, and only institutional differences 
result in different actual entrepreneurship rates.  
 
According to Schumpeter (1934), the services provided by financial 
intermediaries -  evaluation of projects, including the potential for expansion, the risk of 
failure, firm performance - are essential for technological innovation and economic 
growth. Several authors, among them Audretsch et al. (2009) and Cassar (2004), 
suggest that financial constrains are important to determine the likelihood of new 
business starts. Examining a sample of nascent entrepreneurs rather than established 
incumbent firms becomes particularly illuminating. Hsu (2004) calls attention for the 
difficulty faced by entrepreneurs without an established reputation in convincing 
external source providers to provide financial capital. 
 
Almost by definition, an entrepreneur has idiosyncratic beliefs or knowledge on 
the worth of a specific business opportunity.
4
 If entrepreneurs and financial institutions 
shared the same knowledge base and beliefs about the market opportunity, access to 
finance would not likely be a problem. The suppliers of capital would lend when the 
market interest rate is lower than the new venture´s expected rate of return, or undertake 
the creation of the firm themselves. Finance would not be an issue.
5
 But entrepreneurs 
                                                 
4 Even more objective factors such as user needs - Von Hippel (1986) - or production function aspects - 
Bruder, Preisendorfer and Ziegler (1992) – which help entrepreneurs identify a market opportunity, as 
suggested by Shane and Venkataraman (2000), consist of information whose interpretation is very personal. 
5 Shane and Venkataraman (2000) go as far as suggesting that the other sources of finance would price 
financial resources so that the profits of the entrepreneur would be driven closer to zero and incentives to 
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beliefs are so personal
6
 it is sometimes hard to believe they will support a viable firm, 
let alone a profitable one. In addition the risk associated with the creation of new firms 
is much larger than that associated with ongoing enterprises, making a sound financial 
evaluation an even more complex affair. 
 
 It is likely that in countries with more developed financial systems, be it banks 
or stock markets, entrepreneurs will have improved access to funding at all stages of 
business creation.
7
 Countries with larger banking systems and stock markets, measured 
as a share of GDP, are likely to offer more opportunities for business creation. Also, 
higher turnover rates and lower net interest margins correlate with more liquid and 
efficient financial markets. These are precisely the type of indicators we will test for 
their impact on female and male entrepreneurship rates. 
 
But financial development can be a two-edged sword. Consider first the 
perspective of the lender on those individuals that, justly or unjustly, are perceived to 
have lower collateral or lower abilities, such as the poor and the uneducated. On the one 
hand, as deeper and more efficient financial markets expand lending, they will also lend 
more to, say, the poor, the less educated. This may be the result of a wider availability 
of funds and better information systems, for instance. We will call this the financial 
expansion effect. On the other hand, financial development, through a more intensive 
use of screening devices, may result in a move away from lending to the poor and the 
uneducated. We call this the financial substitution effect. From the perspective of the 
borrower and possible entrepreneur, lower interest rates and wider availability of credit 
may further entrepreneurship. However, a wider availability of finance may encourage 
investment in established rather than new companies and, as it makes it easier to smooth 
income through difficult periods, lower the supply of entrepreneurs. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
create a new venture would disappear. This argument ignores the role of competition between suppliers of 
finance, as well as the potential undertaking of firm creation by the owners of capital themselves. 
6 According to Schumpeter (1934) if  many potential entrepreneurs share the same perceptions about which 
opportunities are profitable, competition in the product market would ensue so that the profit rate would 
decrease to the point where the incentive to pursue firm creation would be eliminated. 
7 Though the ideal would be to compile indicators on entrepreneurial finance that are consistent across a wide 
set of countries across time, that has not been so far undertaken. The wide availability of more general 
indicators on the development of the banking and the stock market systems presents a wealth of information 
that we explore here. 
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 As mentioned above, entrepreneurs may be motivated by need or by an attractive 
market opportunity.
8
 Financial institutions may be unable to differentiate between the 
two types, which may face very different expected return and risk profiles.
9
 As financial 
markets become more sophisticated and more is discerned about each venture, there 
may be a financial expansion or a financial substitution effect.  
 
Several models emphasize that well functioning financial intermediaries and 
markets ameliorate information and transaction costs and thereby foster efficient 
resource allocation and faster growth. King and Levine (1993a,b), Levine (1998, 1999), 
and Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) show that bank development helps explain 
economic growth but these papers do not include stock market measures. On the other 
hand,  Beck and Levine (2002), Levine and Zervos (1998) as well as Rosseau and 
Wachel (2000) found in a panel data of countries that both bank and stock market 
development have a positive impact on country’s growth. In sum, as pointed by Beck 
and Levine (2002), economic theory suggests “conflicting evidence about whether stock 
markets and banks are substitutes, complements, or whether one is more conducive to 
growth than other”.
10
 In our study we will use both types of indicators. 
 
 
2.2. Gender 
 
Several authors have found that women are discriminated against in access to 
financial markets. Alesina et al. (2008), using Bank of Italy data on individual 
transactions involving about 200 Italian banks, find evidence that women pay higher 
interest rates than men after controlling for an array of characteristics of self-employed 
                                                 
8 In the case of large barriers to entry or radically new technologies, the expected return may be very high. 
The latter case is discussed in Utterback (1994). 
9 Some information asymmetries may inhibit the marketing of innovative ideas. This problem affects 
especially very innovative new ventures in the earliest stage of the startup process but may be mitigated by the 
issuing of  patents and prototypes. Patents are a means to protect property rights and signal the 
entrepreneur´s ability to appropriate the returns to innovation. According to Audretsch et all (2009) 
prototypes signal the actual feasibility of the proposed project, providing additional value to patents as signals 
and thus make financing easier. 
10 Generally most new firms have to rely on some form of external finance from banks or other sources. The 
literature so far has focused on the informational asymmetries and transaction costs associated with the 
creation of new ventures, which inhibit access to finance in the earlier stages of the firm creation process. 
“Banks and stock markets may play a role in reducing these asymmetries and lowering transaction costs but 
we do not have information on how much markets and banks ameliorate information and transaction costs”, 
as  pointed in Beck and Levine (2002).  
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individuals or owners of micro firms, as well as the characteristics of their businesses 
and  their local credit markets.
11
 Female borrowers pay between around 20 basis points 
more than men,
12
 and this in spite of the fact that female-owned businesses go bankrupt 
less frequently than businesses owned by males, and have a slightly better credit 
history.
13
 Female owners pay more for credit independently of the market structure and 
benefit less from regional social capital. In principle, discrimination could be statistical 
or taste-based but given that women default less, the latter type is more likely. Taste 
discrimination implies that lender “holding risk constant, charge more to women 
because they are biased against them”.
14
 Alesina and Giuliano (2007) show that Italy is 
an extreme case amongst OECD countries in viewing women in a “traditional role”, but 
this type of gender discrimination in access to finance is likely to exist in other 
countries.
15
  
 
Scherr et al. (1993) use the 41.000 firms from the 1982 Characteristics of 
Business Owners survey and finds that financing of the small start ups is related to the 
entrepreneur’s characteristics, as well as industry, profitability and the size of the firm.  
 
There are also reasons to doubt the relevance of the entrepreneur´s gender in 
access to financial markets. Cassar (2002), which examines four different types of 
financing: leverage, long-term leverage, outside financing and bank financing, [[[Does 
he examine just the type or also the amount?]]]
 
suggests that financiers weigh firm 
                                                 
11 The authors also control for risk, expressed in the past credit history of the individual borrower, the sector 
in which she operates and the type of activity. Results are also robust when controlling for social capital and 
trust. The period covered ranges from 2004 to 2006 and the total number of observations is 1.2 million. 
12 The figure varies between 16 and 42 basis points, depending on the econometric specification.  
13 Armendiz and Morduch  (2005) survey of microfinance in developing countries also presents evidence of 
women being significantly more reliable borrowers than men. 
14 Becker (1971) developed the taste-based discrimination model. In the present case, if banks discriminate 
against women due to a “preference for discrimination“, it means they are willing foregoing expected profits. 
Other banks may exploit this opportunity and make an extra profit by not discriminating, but this only if they 
don´t share the taste for discrimination. Alesina et al. (2008) show that banks run by women are less likely to 
discriminate against women but the presence of women on bank boards is minimal in Italy. We risk admitting 
this as a general fact. 
15 Several studies unveil evidence of taste discrimination in different settings. Blanchflower et al. (2003) using 
data from the 1993 and 1998 US National Surveys of Small Business Finance show evidence of racial 
discrimination in the small-business credit market. Bertrand et al. (2005) conducted an interesting experiment 
in South Africa: a lender mailed out over 50,000 letters to incumbent clients offering short-term loans at a 
randomly chosen interest rate and suggesting different psychological characteristics; the authors observe that 
loan take-up was affected both by the interest rates and the psychological features in the letter. Ravina (2008) 
using data from Prosper.com, a 150 million dollars online lending market in which borrowers post loan 
requests that include verifiable financial information, photos, offered interest rate etc., found that personal 
characteristics like beauty and race affect credit conditions though unrelated with the probability of not 
paying the loan. 
 7 
characteristics such as size and non-current assets when deciding whether to lend, while 
the characteristics of the entrepreneurs – such as education, race and gender - were not 
found to influence the financing of the start-up.
16
  
 
The choice of being an entrepreneur may be relatively exogenous and mostly 
determined by personal experiences that are extremely difficult to identify.
17
 Empirical 
research has shown that external social influences since early age, including having an 
entrepreneurial father, mother or uncle increases the likelihood of becoming an 
entrepreneur.
18
 However, if we think that in many countries daughters are less exposed 
to such experiences or less likely to infer from those experiences relevant guidance for 
their professional future, the relevance of gender is restored.  
 
 
2. Data and Specification 
 
 
2.1. Data and Summary Statistics 
 
 
Drawing on the literature on financial development and economic growth, we 
collect indicators related to banks and to stock markets for the years 2001 to 2004 from 
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, (2000) updates. For bank development we use bank 
credit to the private sector as a share of GDP as a measure of the extension of banking 
services in the economy. This same indicator is used by Levine and Zervos (1998) and 
Beck and Levine (2002).
19
 Additionally we use the net interest as a proxy for the 
efficiency of the banking system. 
                                                 
16 Cassar (2004) uses a more limited range of owners characteristics than Scherr et a.l (1993), but did consider 
several firm-specific variables such as size around start-up, asset structure and legal organization of the firm 
not included in Scherr et al. (1993). Shane and Venkataraman (2000) criticize empirical research looking 
separately at entrepreneurs as opposed to other individuals since this may lead to a poor identification of the 
role of personal attributes as opposed to profitable market opportunities. 
17 As an example, Shane and Venkataraman (2000) argue that optimistic individuals will have higher 
probability of exploiting business opportunities. 
18 See Djankov (2006a). Shavinina (2007) studied Richard Branson´s biography in detail and found that some 
of micro-social factors like parental trust, an entrepreneurial attitude among family members, open and 
sincere relationships, treating everybody as equals, high ethical standards and other personality traits were key 
factors for Richard Branson´s entrepreneurial giftedness. 
19 Naturally, the extent to which bank claims by deposit money banks divided by GDP  facilitate information 
and transaction costs is not known with exactitude. Beck and Levine (2002) argue that bank credit improves 
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To measure stock market development we use two indicators: as a measure of 
overall size of the stock market we use market capitalization relative to GDP and as a 
measure of market liquidity, we use the ratio of total value traded in the stock market 
divided by stock market capitalization.
20
  
 
Each of these financial variables will be used successively, in a similar 
specification, and we will learn the general effect of bank and stock market 
development indices on the entrepreneurship rates of males and females. 
 
As to the data on entrepreneurship, we use the Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitor.
21
 GEM covers about 400,000 individuals between the dates of 2001 – with 
65,681 individuals - to 2004 - with 140,535 individuals - , for 41 developed and 
developing countries. In this data base entrepreneurs are defined individuals starting a 
new business who are (i) alone or with others currently trying to start a new business, 
including any type of self-employment or (ii) alone or with others are trying to start a 
new business or new venture together with their employer as an effort that is part of 
their normal work, and who (a) have been active in the past 12 months in trying to start 
the new business, (b) expect to own part of it, and (c) had not paid salaries and wages to 
anybody, including the owner/managers, for more than 3 months.  
 
This dataset is particularly adequate to address the issue at hand since, as 
suggested by Ardagna and Lusardi (2008), GEM data represents the potential rather 
than the actual supply of entrepreneurs. In addition, the GEM dataset has the advantages 
of having no survivorship bias,
22
 no relevant geographic or industry limitations.
23
  
 
                                                                                                                                               
upon alternative measures, such as the ratio of M3/GDP used by other studies as proxy for financial 
development. Since the bank credit variable considers bank credit to the private sector, it excludes credits by 
development banks and loans to the government and public enterprises, which are part of M3.  
20 See also Levine and Zervos (1998) and Beck and Levine (2002). 
21 Henceforth GEM. 
22 The bias caused by survivorship of some firms, leading to the fact that the sample of firms at any given 
time is not representative of the population of the firms at the time of start up. The longer the time period 
elapsing between the time when respondents are surveyed and the beginning of the start-up, the greater the 
influence of the survivorship bias. With enough time elapsing only surviving firms  would to be in the sample. 
23 As an example, Shaffer and Pulver (1985), Carter and Van Auken (1990) and Van Auken and Neeley (1996) 
are based on a dataset from Midwest US states alone. 
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Our empirical specification will control for individual characteristics relating to 
age, education, individual income and work status. We will separately estimate how 
personal characteristics, country financial development and their interaction affect the 
likelihood that someone becoming an entrepreneur.  
 
Table 1 presents summary statistics of financial indicators: private credit by 
deposit money banks divided by GDP has a mean of 96% across the sample, a minimum 
of 5.3% and a maximum of 105%. Net interest margin - bank's net interest revenue as a 
share of its interest-bearing (total earning) assets - .has a mean of 3.4% and varies from 
0.89% to 13.9%. Stock Market Capitalization divided by GDP has a mean of 88% and 
varies from 0.77% to 408%. Finally, Stock Market Total Value Traded (total shares 
traded on the stock market exchange) divided by Stock Market Capitalization has a 
mean of 92.5% and varies from 0.23% to 306%. The higher the value of these indicators 
the more developed is the financial system with the exception of the net interest margin. 
In the case of the net interest margin, higher value signals a less efficient financial 
market. Table 2 shows that these indicators are highly correlated, as one would expect. 
 
Table 3 presents summary statistics as to the type and characteristics of 
entrepreneurs. About 4% of the individuals in our sample are opportunity driven 
entrepreneurs and about 1% are driven by need. The sample size consists of 414,569 
individuals, 53% of which are women, and the average in the sample is about 43 years 
old. Also, 56% of individuals work at the time of the interview, 10% is retired, 5% are 
students and 23% are individuals who do not work at the time of the interview – and, in 
addition, are neither students nor retired.  In terms of income, 26% of individuals report 
that their income is in the lowest 33rd income percentile of their country’s income 
distribution at the time of the interview, 27% report that their income is in the middle 
33rd income percentile and 20% in the upper 33rd income percentile. Individuals with a 
high school degree, college degree or some graduate experience correspond to 33%, 
22% and 8% of our sample, respectively. 
 
 
2.2. Specification 
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We now formally analyze the effect of financial indicators on gender 
entrepreneurship. Our dependent variables will be the entrepreneurship rate by 
opportunity (TEA OPP) and by need (TEA NEC), and our independent variables will 
include a host of individual characteristics, taken alone and interacted with the financial 
indicator. The dependent variable is binary, and we use probit estimation and cluster 
standard errors at country level. Our sample includes countries whose macroeconomic 
and institutional characteristics vary widely and may correlate with the entrepreneurship 
indices. However, we control for country specific characteristics by including country 
fixed effects in all our specifications. 
 
 For an individual i, in country j, at time t, we define the outcome of interest y i j t 
as TEA OPP or TEA NEC, an indicator which takes the values 1 or 0, with the former 
indicating entrepreneurial activity. We estimate the equation for y i j t: 
 
y i j t:= α + β1 . X i j t  + β2  . F  jt  + β3  . X i j t  . F jt  + η t + γ t + ε i j t      (1) 
 
where α is a constant, X i j t  is a vector of individual characteristics - including age, 
employment status, education and income -, Fjt    is the aggregate financial development 
indicator, varying across countries and over time. This same vector of individual 
characteristics is then interacted with each of the financial indicators Fjt  to produce 
different estimates. Also, ηt is a vector of country dummies and γt a vector of year 
dummies.  
 
The coefficient on a variable such as “Low Income”, for instance, will give us 
the change in the probability of becoming an entrepreneur for an individual with the 
average characteristics in the sample. The variable “F jt  * Low Income” will give us the 
additional – positive or negative – effect on the probability of a low income person 
becoming an entrepreneur. Positive and significant coefficients on the variables 
interacted with the financial indicator suggest that an improvement in that financial 
indicator will result in an increase in entrepreneurship rates for that specific group.  
 
 
3. Results 
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In Tables 4 through 7 we present the estimates obtained from the probit models, 
organized successively by type of entrepreneurial activity – TEAOPP and TEANEC -, 
by financial indicator – bank and then stock market indicators -, and by gender. The first 
point to be made, observable throughout, is that individual characteristics are associated 
with the likelihood of attempts to create new ventures. Entrepreneurial activity 
decreases weakly with age
24
 and is positively associated with working status 
irrespective of gender and type of motivation – opportunity or need. Student status 
seems to discourage entrepreneurship, more significantly so for females. A high income 
status encourages individual entrepreneurial activity by opportunity, while low income 
discourages it. The reverse, though less starkly, seems to occur with entrepreneurship by 
need.
25
 Also very consistent is the relation between education and entrepreneurial 
activity. While any education above basic education encourages entrepreneurship by 
opportunity, the higher educational levels are negatively associated with 
entrepreneurship by need. Indicators of financial development are for the most part not 
significantly related to entrepreneurial activity, lacking either statistical or economic – 
quantitative – significance.
26
  
 
As to the interaction between financial indicators and the different population 
groups, the results are mixed. Financial development seems to weakly facilitate 
entrepreneurial activity by older people – as testified by the positive coefficients 
throughout, though statistical significance is present in only one case. Also, financial 
development facilitates the mergence of low income entrepreneurs by opportunity and 
not so by need. Only high income males are encouraged to create new ventures when 
                                                 
24 According to Evans and Leighton (1989) the probability of an individual becoming self-employed is 
independent of age or experience for the first 20 years of employment and this may be explained by liquidity 
constraints and the need to accumulate assets to start a business or because it takes time to identify a market 
opportunity – older people may faster identify a business opportunity but may be less prone to exploit it. 
25 One should remind oneself we are controlling for country effects, including income per capita, through the 
introduction of country dummies. 
26 This was to a certain extent expected, as these indicators do not vary with each individual within a country. 
Beck and Levine (2002) found that the results for the relation between financial development and growth 
were not consistent across econometric methods and specifications and conclude that overall financial 
development matters for growth but it is difficult to identify the specific components of the financial system 
most closely associated with economic success. In addition, Cassar (2004) argues that “firms with a relative 
lack of tangible assets appear to be financed through less formal means, where nonbank financing, such as 
loans from individuals unrelated to business, plays a more important role in the capital structure for start 
ups.” This highlights the importance of network resources in these types of ventures and the possible smaller 
relevance of formal financial intermediaries. 
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their motivation is need, while entrepreneurship by opportunity is overall unaffected. A 
curious pattern also emerges as to education. While educated individuals are encouraged 
by financial development to become entrepreneurs driven by need, the same financial 
development does not strongly affect their rates of entrepreneurship by opportunity. The 
pattern for high income and highly educated individuals suggests that their 
entrepreneurial activity is encouraged by financial development mostly in the case 
where they are motivated by need. Generally, our results suggest that the opportunity 
motivation is less sensitive to financial development and constraints than 
entrepreneurship by need, and this is true even for high income and highly educated 
individuals. 
 
As to the gender pattern, there are 22 statistically significant coefficients for the 
interacted variables in the case of males, as opposed to 16 statistically significant 
coefficients for females. Given that financial development is generally associated with 
an encouragement of entrepreneurial activity, we find that, surprisingly, males seem to 
benefit more from financial development than females. This suggests that it is not 
financial development that explains the lower entrepreneurship rates of females or, 
alternatively, financial development does not seem able to correct any gender bias in 
access to capital. In addition, as will become clearer in the Figures presented below, the 
quantitative effect of financial development on entrepreneurial activity tends to be 
larger for males than for females. The financial expansion effect associated with 
financial development benefits mostly males. AS to the financial substitution effect, it 
seems non-existent as to entrepreneurship by need – all coefficients are positive -, but 
present in the case of individuals with higher education or graduate experience 
motivated by opportunity, which are negatively affected by financial development. Here 
it is as though financial development, by bringing forth more sophisticated information 
systems and wider acceptance of other collateral, makes individuals with education les 
privileged in the access to credit.
27
  
  
In Figures 1 through 9 we highlight the impact of financial development on the 
entrepreneurship rate of different population groups.  We represent the product of the 
coefficient taken from Tables 4 and 7 and multiply it by the standard deviation of the 
                                                 
27
 Please note that these individuals have nevertheless an entrepreneurial rate larger than the average, as 
witnessed by the positive coefficients on education as an isolated individual characteristic. 
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financial indicator (Table 1), thus obtaining an estimate of the quantitative effect of 
specific improvements in the financial system. We conduct the same exercise for 
entrepreneurship by need and by opportunity. As an example, the value close to 0.005 
for Private Credit Banks/GDP and Low Income males in Figure 2 is the product of the 
coefficient 0.0127 from Table 4 by the standard deviation of Private Credit by 
Banks/GDP in our sample. In all the Figures solid grey and black bars - representing 
women and men, respectively - mean that the coefficient in the probit regressions - 
Tables 4 to 7 - is significant. 
 
Analyzing entrepreneurship by opportunity  - TEA OPP - first, regarding age, 
there is evidence, in Figure 1 that older males become more entrepreneurial with 
financial development. In Figure 2 we find that all coefficients for Low Income 
individuals are positive, indicating that financial development encourages 
entrepreneurship by this group. Also, it is low income males that seem to benefit most 
from financial development, with more coefficients that are quantitatively and 
statistically more significant. The contrast with High Income individuals (Figure 3) is 
stark, as all except one coefficient in the latter cases is statistically insignificant, and the 
statistically significant coefficient is negative, suggesting that financial development 
makes finance relatively less available to High Income females. Finally, we also analyze 
individuals with graduate experience in Figure 4, which we find to be relatively 
discouraged when a country becomes more financially developed. 
 
As to entrepreneurship by need, in Figures 5 through 9, we find that Individuals 
Not Working (Figure 5) benefit from financial development, increasing the rate at 
which they try new ventures motivated by need in the case of an increase in stock 
market capitalization but not in the case of an increase in market liquidity (stock value 
traded/stock market capitalization). As for individual income (Figures 6 and 7), both 
low income males and females increase their entrepreneurship rate but the coefficients 
were statistically significant only in the case of the financial indicators net interest 
margin and market liquidity, and for women entrepreneurs. As for high income 
individuals, only males respond to financial development by increasing their 
entrepreneurship rate with significant coefficients, and this increase is captured by all 
financial indicators. Those with college education (Figure 8) and graduate experience 
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(Figure 9) do seem to benefit from financial development, whether male or female. The 
quantitative effect of financial development is higher for the male entrepreneurship rate.   
 
In sum, financial development does affect specific population groups differently, 
as to their inclination to create new business ventures. It seems that the effect is more 
significant in the case of entrepreneurship by need and stronger for males than for 
females.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Financial development, though generally encouraging entrepreneurial activity, is 
unlikely, by itself, to contribute to bring male and female entrepreneurship rates closer 
together. Moreover, our results suggest that it is entrepreneurship by need that is most 
affected by financial development, suggesting that the possible more complex aspects of 
evaluating projects associated with market or technological opportunities are not 
overcome by aggregate financial development and need more specific measures. 
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Appendix – Variables Definition 
 
TEA = 1 if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and managers of a 
young firm, 0 otherwise. Source: Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM). 
 
TEAOPP = 1 if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and managers of a 
young firm to take advantage of a business opportunity, 0 otherwise. Entrepreneurship 
indices - source: Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM). 
 
TEANEC = 1 if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and managers of a 
young firm because they could find no better economic work, 0 otherwise. 
Entrepreneurship indices - source: Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM). 
 
AGE.= age of individuals at the time of  the interview. 
 
WORKING=individuals who work at the time of the interview. 
 
NOT WORKING=individuals who do not work at the time of the interview (and are not 
students, not retired, and do not work at home).  
 
RETIRED= individuals who are retired at the time of the interview.  
 
STUDENTS= individuals who are students at the time of the interview.  
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LOW INCOME=individuals who report that their income is in the lowest 33rd income 
percentile of their country´s income distribution at the time of the interview.  
 
MIDDLE INCOME = individuals who report that their income is in the middle 33rd 
income percentile of their country´s income distribution at the time of the interview.  
 
HIGH INCOME = individuals who report that their income is in the upper 33rd income 
percentile of their country´s income distribution at the time of the interview.  
 
SECONDARY EDUCATION  (HIGH SCHOOL) = only individuals with a high school 
degree.  
 
COLLEGE = only individuals with a college degree.  
 
GRADUATE EXPERIENCE .= only individuals with at least some graduate school 
education.  
 
PRIVATE CREDIT BY DEPOSIT MONEY BANKS/GDP= Private credit by deposit 
money banks to GDP, calculated using the following deflation method:  {(0.5)*[Ft/P_et 
+ Ft-1/P_et-1]}/[GDPt/P_at] where F is credit to the private sector, P_e is end-of period 
CPI, and P_a is average annual CPI - source: Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and  Levine, (2000) 
and updates.  
 
NET INTEREST MARGIN= Accounting value of bank's net interest revenue as a share 
of its interest-bearing (total earning) assets - source: Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and  Levine, 
(2000) and updates.  
  
STOCK MARKET CAPITALIZATION/GDP= Value of listed shares to GDP, 
calculated using the following deflation  method:  {(0.5)*[Ft/P_et + Ft-1/P_et-
1]}/[GDPt/P_at] where F is stock market capitalization, P_e is end-of period CPI, and 
P_a  is average annual CPI - source: Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and  Levine, (2000) and 
updates. 
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STOCK MARKET TOTAL VALUE TRADED/ STOCK MARKET 
CAPITALIZATION= Total shares traded on the stock market exchange divided by 
stock market capitalization - source: Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and  Levine, (2000) and 
updates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 1 : Summary Statistics of Financial Development Indicators 
Variables  Mean  Std. Dev. Minimum  Maximum 
Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks/GDP   0.9604714 0.3834246 0.05319 10.553898 
     
Net Interest Margin  0.034063 0.0211351 0.008943 0.139764 
     
Stock Market Capitalization/GDP 0.882614 0.5653578 0.007727 40.786483 
     
Stock Mkt Total Value Traded/Stock Mkt 
Capitalization  
0.9252373 0.5429359 0.0022796 30.563341 
 
Table 2: Correlation Matrix of Financial Development Indicators 
 
 pcrd netint stmk stval/stmk 
     
Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks/GDP  (pcrd) 1.0000    
     
Net Interest Margin (netint) -0.6071 1.0000   
     
Stock Market Capitalization/GDP (stmk) 0.3728 -0.1724 1.0000  
     
Stock Mkt Total Value Traded/Stck Mkt Capitalization (stval/stmk) 0.3830 -0.3191 0.0839 1.0000 
 
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics of Individual Characteristics and Entrepreneurship Rates 
 
Variables Mean  Std. Dev.  
 
Minimum  Maximum  
Entrepreneurship Rate by Opportunity 0.04 0.20 0 1 
     
Entrepreneurship Rate by Necessity 0.01 0.11 0 1 
     
Female 0.53 0.50 0 1 
     
Male 0.47 0.50 0 1 
     
Age 43.32 16.37 14 98 
     
Working 0.56 0.50 0 1 
     
Retired 0.10 0.30 0 1 
     
Not Working 0.23 0.42 0 1 
     
Students 0.05 0.21 0 1 
     
Low Income 0.26 0.44 0 1 
     
Middle Income 0.27 0.44 0 1 
     
High Income 0.20 0.40 0 1 
     
Secondary  Education (High School) 0.33 0.47 0 1 
     
 College Education 0.22 0.41 0 1 
     
Graduate Experience 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Note: Sample size: 414,569 individuals.  
 
 
 
Table 4: TEA by Opportunity – Banks  
 Fjt = Credit Banks/GDP Fjt =  Net Interest Margin 
 Female Male Female Male 
Age -0.0005 -0.0013 -0.0004 -0.0009 
 (0.0001)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** 
     
Working 0.0221 0.0267 0.0182 0.0369 
 (0.0056)*** (0.0050)*** (0.0034)*** (0.0043)*** 
     
Students -0.0064 -0.0249 -0.0090 -0.0169 
 (0.0048) (0.0070)*** (0.0036)** (0.0072)** 
     
Not Working -0.0013 -0.0057 0.0001 0.0082 
 (0.0068) (0.0118) (0.0045) (0.0095) 
     
Low Income -0.0053 -0.0183 -0.0028 -0.0023 
 (0.0016)*** (0.0033)*** (0.0013)** (0.0023) 
     
High Income 0.0060 0.0098 0.0066 0.0185 
 (0.0037)* (0.0074) (0.0018)*** (0.0043)*** 
     
Secondary Degree 0.0104 0.0160 0.0020 0.0078 
 (0.0032)*** (0.0060)*** (0.0014) (0.0036)** 
     
Post Secondary Degree 0.0112 0.0293 0.0089 0.0216 
 (0.0063)** (0.0097)*** (0.0028)*** (0.0055)*** 
     
Graduate Experience 0.0176 0.0451 0.0108 0.0226 
 (0.0071)*** (0.0121)*** (0.0032)*** (0.0050)*** 
     
Fjt 0.0013 -0.0057 0.0646 -0.0118 
 (0.0124) (0.0272) (0.1417) (0.1587) 
     
Fjt *Age 0.0001 0.0003 0.0007 0.0016 
 (0.0001) (0.0002)* (0.0016) (0.0024) 
     
Fjt *Working -0.0024 0.0081 -0.0526 0.1035 
 (0.0050) (0.0066) (0.0688) (0.0744) 
     
Fjt *Students -0.0063 0.0024 0.0289 0.2779 
 (0.0074) (0.0161) (0.0975) (0.1882) 
     
Fjt *Not Working -0.0015 0.0016 0.0472 0.2885 
 (0.0066) (0.0144) (0.0863) (0.1388)** 
     
Fjt *Low Income 0.0016 0.0127 0.0319 0.1692 
 (0.0018) (0.0034)*** (0.0234) (0.0517)*** 
     
Fjt *High Income 0.0008 0.0056 -0.0125 0.0667 
 (0.0026) (0.0059) (0.0426) (0.0938) 
     
Fjt *Secondary Degree -0.0051 -0.0055 -0.0657 -0.0576 
 (0.0027)* (0.0052) (0.0292)** (0.0661) 
     
Fjt * Post Sec. Degree -0.0012 -0.0063 -0.0014 0.0118 
 (0.0045) (0.0069) (0.0724) (0.1238) 
     
Fjt *Grad. Experience -0.0025 -0.0097 -0.0360 -0.1528 
 (0.0037) (0.0064) (0.0440) (0.0861)* 
Pseudo R2 0.1103 0.0817 0.1112 0.0820 
N. of observations 215292 192161 215114 192223 
Note: Significant at 1% (***); 5% (**) and 10% (*). Standard errors in parenthesis adjusted 
for clustering on country. Net Interest Margin coefficient and interactions multiplied by -1. 
Table 5: TEA by Opportunity (Stock Market) 
 Fjt = Stock Mkt Cap/GDP Fjt =  V.Traded/Stmk 
 Female Male Female Male 
Age -0.0004 -0.0012 -0.0003 -0.0010 
 (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** 
     
Working 0.0177 0.0256 0.0222 0.0350 
 (0.0044)*** (0.0041)*** (0.0037)*** (0.0038)*** 
     
Students -0.0119 -0.0272 0.0015 -0.0104 
 (0.0031)*** (0.0055)*** (0.0056) (0.0079) 
     
Not Working -0.0071 -0.0179 -0.0006 0.0025 
 (0.0044) (0.0064)*** (0.0045) (0.0094) 
     
Low Income -0.0062 -0.0101 -0.0049 -0.0109 
 (0.0010)*** (0.0031)*** (0.0014)*** (0.0044)** 
     
High Income 0.0097 0.0220 0.0067 0.0124 
 (0.0028)*** (0.0066)*** (0.0027)*** (0.0052)*** 
     
Secondary Degree 0.0047 0.0102 0.0053 0.0094 
 (0.0022)** (0.0041)*** (0.0028)** (0.0042)** 
     
Post Secondary Degree 0.0061 0.0167 0.0108 0.0239 
 (0.0032)** (0.0054)*** (0.0040)*** (0.0058)*** 
     
Graduate Experience 0.0146 0.0268 0.0236 0.0442 
 (0.0050)*** (0.0070)*** (0.0068)*** (0.0095)*** 
     
Fjt -0.0074 -0.0248 0.0084 0.0031 
 (0.0059) (0.0097)*** (0.0045)* (0.0063) 
     
Fjt *Age 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
     
Fjt *Working 0.0031 0.0097 -0.0025 -0.0040 
 (0.0033) (0.0046)** (0.0035) (0.0042) 
     
Fjt *Students 0.0054 0.0074 -0.0216 -0.0274 
 (0.0050) (0.0079) (0.0070)*** (0.0166)* 
     
Fjt *Not Working 0.0068 0.0183 -0.0021 -0.0090 
 (0.0043) (0.0078)** (0.0059) (0.0080) 
     
Fjt *Low Income 0.0029 0.0025 0.0011 0.0030 
 (0.0013)** (0.0038) (0.0014) (0.0045) 
     
Fjt * High Income -0.0024 -0.0057 0.0003 0.0034 
 (0.0025) (0.0061) (0.0022) (0.0048) 
     
Fjt *Secondary Degree 0.0004 0.0004 -0.0005 0.0009 
 (0.0018) (0.0033) (0.0022) (0.0042) 
     
Fjt * Post Sec. Degree 0.0034 0.0050 -0.0011 -0.0019 
 (0.0022) (0.0034) (0.0029) (0.0044) 
     
Fjt *Grad. Experience -0.0003 0.0034 -0.0066 -0.0099 
 (0.0026) (0.0040) (0.0030)** (0.0054)* 
Pseudo R2 0.1105 0.0816 0.1106 0.0816 
N. of observations 218175 195175 218175 195175 
Note: Significant at 1% (***); 5% (**) and 10% (*). Standard errors in parenthesis adjusted 
for clustering on country. 
Table 6: TEA by Necessity – Banks  
 Fjt = Credit Banks/GDP Fjt =  Net Interest Margin 
 Female Male Female Male 
Age -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.00003)*** (0.00003)*** (0.00002)*** (0.00003)*** 
     
Working 0.0055 0.0061 0.0056 0.0117 
 (0.0014)*** (0.0029)** (0.0014)*** (0.0019)*** 
     
Students -0.0039 -0.0060 -0.0029 0.0041 
 (0.0008)*** (0.0027) (0.0011)* (0.0070) 
     
Not Working -0.0007 0.0088 0.0024 0.0134 
 (0.0023) (0.0088) (0.0020) (0.0073)** 
     
Low Income -0.0001 -0.0005 0.0018 0.0026 
 (0.0006) (0.0011) (0.0007)*** (0.0015)* 
     
High Income -0.0026 -0.0047 -0.0004 -0.0004 
 (0.0003)*** (0.0011)*** (0.0009) (0.0010) 
     
Secondary Degree -0.0004 -0.0020 0.0004 -0.0011 
 (0.0007) (0.0012)* (0.0007) (0.0011) 
     
Post Secondary Degree -0.0021 -0.0042 0.0000 -0.0002 
 (0.0010)* (0.0016)** (0.0009) (0.0014) 
     
Graduate Experience -0.0030 -0.0050 0.0027 0.0011 
 (0.0007)*** (0.0014)*** (0.0020)* (0.0024) 
     
Fjt -0.0068 -0.0156 -0.0968 -0.1293 
 (0.0054) (0.0068)** (0.0246)*** (0.0311)*** 
     
Fjt *Age 0.00001 0.00002 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.0003) (0.0005) 
     
Fjt *Working -0.0011 0.0029 0.0044 0.0751 
 (0.0014) (0.0040) (0.0141) (0.0302)*** 
     
Fjt *Students 0.0009 0.0035 0.0401 0.2139 
 (0.0031) (0.0067) (0.0306) (0.0925)** 
     
Fjt *Not Working 0.0002 -0.0032 0.0445 0.0957 
 (0.0025) (0.0065) (0.0208)** (0.0553)* 
     
Fjt *Low Income 0.0008 0.0022 0.0168 0.0170 
 (0.0007) (0.0015) (0.0070)** (0.0159) 
     
Fjt * High Income 0.0024 0.0036 0.0176 0.0407 
 (0.0007) (0.0012)*** (0.0127) (0.0203)** 
     
Fjt *Secondary Degree 0.0007 0.0015 0.0054 -0.0075 
 (0.0009)*** (0.0011) (0.0101) (0.0197) 
     
Fjt * Post Sec. Degree 0.0019 0.0034 0.0195 0.0419 
 (0.0012)* (0.0019)* (0.0174) (0.0326) 
     
Fjt *Grad. Experience 0.0043 0.0044 0.0726 0.0947 
 (0.0014)*** (0.0021)** (0.0216)*** (0.0413)** 
Pseudo R2 0.1569 0.1011 0.1614 0.1039 
N. of observations 215292 192161 215114 192223 
Note: Significant at 1% (***); 5% (**) and 10% (*). Standard errors in parenthesis adjusted 
for clustering on country. Net Interest Margin coefficient and interactions multiplied by -1. 
 
Table 7: TEA by Necessity  (Stock Market) 
 Fjt = Stock Mkt Cap/GDP Fjt =  V.Traded/Stmk 
 Female Male Female Male 
Age -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.00002)*** (0.00002)*** (0.00002)*** (0.00003)*** 
     
Working 0.0045 0.0055 0.0063 0.0091 
 (0.0014)*** (0.0023)** (0.0013)*** (0.0024)*** 
     
Students -0.0035 -0.0058 -0.0028 -0.0034 
 (0.0008)*** (0.0026)* (0.0011)* (0.0030) 
     
Not Working -0.0023 0.0003 0.0009 0.0101 
 (0.0016) (0.0040) (0.0020) (0.0062)** 
     
Low Income 0.0011 0.0017 0.0001 0.0006 
 (0.0007)* (0.0013) (0.0006) (0.0011) 
     
High Income -0.0017 -0.0031 -0.0014 -0.0040 
 (0.0006)*** (0.0009)*** (0.0004)*** (0.0008)*** 
     
Secondary Degree -0.0003 -0.0018 -0.0003 -0.0021 
 (0.0005) (0.0010)* (0.0005) (0.0009)** 
     
Post Secondary Degree -0.0017 -0.0028 -0.0018 -0.0032 
 (0.0008)* (0.0013)** (0.0007)** (0.0010)*** 
     
Graduate Experience -0.0008 -0.0022 -0.0028 -0.0059 
 (0.0014) (0.0019) (0.0006)*** (0.0010)*** 
     
Fjt 0.0014 -0.0041 0.0001 -0.0026 
 (0.0026) (0.0032) (0.0028) (0.0038) 
     
Fjt *Age 0.00001 0.0000007 0.000001 0.00002 
 (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00003) (0.00003) 
     
Fjt *Working 0.0003 0.0039 -0.0020 -0.0018 
 (0.0012) (0.0023)* (0.0015) (0.0027) 
     
Fjt *Students -0.0012 0.0019 -0.0044 -0.0038 
 (0.0020) (0.0039) (0.0030) (0.0045) 
     
Fjt *Not Working 0.0027 0.0054 -0.0021 -0.0048 
 (0.0013)** (0.0034)* (0.0024) (0.0043) 
     
Fjt *Low Income -0.0004 0.00004 0.0009 0.0011 
 (0.0006) (0.0012) (0.0005)* (0.0011) 
     
Fjt * High Income 0.0009 0.0015 0.0004 0.0025 
 (0.0006) (0.0007)** (0.0007) (0.0008)*** 
     
Fjt *Secondary Degree 0.0003 0.0009 0.0005 0.0017 
 (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0011) 
     
Fjt * Post Sec. Degree 0.0011 0.0012 0.0015 0.0020 
 (0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0009)* (0.0012)* 
     
Fjt *Grad. Experience 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0038 0.0063 
 (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0012)*** (0.0017)*** 
Pseudo R2 0.1592 0.1024 0.1588 0.1031 
N. of observations 218175 195175 218175 195175 
Note: Significant at 1% (***); 5% (**) and 10% (*). Standard errors in parenthesis adjusted 
for clustering on country. 
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Figure 2
Financial Development and Entrepr. Rate by Opportunity (TEA OPP) 
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Figure 3
Financial Development and Entrepr. Rate by Opportunity (TEA OPP)
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Figure 4
Financial Development and Entrepr. Rate by Opportunity  (TEA OPP)
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 Figure 5
Financial Development and Entrepreneurship Rate by Need (TEA NEC) 
Individuals Not Working
-0.003
-0.002
-0.001
0
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.004
Priv. Credit
Banks/GDP
Net Interest Margin Stock Market Cap. Value Traded/Stock
Market Cap.
Female
Male
 
 
Figure 6
Financial Development and Entrepreneurship Rate by Need (TEA NEC)
Low Income Individuals 
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Figure 7
Financial Development and Entrepreneurship Rate by Need (TEA NEC)
High Income Individuals 
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Figure 8
Financial Development and Entrepreneurship Rate by Need (TEA NEC)
Individuals with College Education 
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Figure 9
Financial Development and Entrepreneurship Rate by Need (TEA NEC)  
Individuals with Graduate Experience 
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